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Integrated assessment modelsRecent calls to do climate policy research with, rather than for, stakeholders have been answered in non-
modelling science. Notwithstanding progress in modelling literature, however, very little of the scenario space
traces back to what stakeholders are ultimately concerned about. With a suite of eleven integrated assessment,
energy system and sectoral models, we carry out a model inter-comparison for the EU, the scenario logic and re-
search questions of which have been formulated based on stakeholders' concerns. The output of this process is a
scenario framework exploring where the region is headed rather than how to achieve its goals, extrapolating its
current policy efforts into the future. We find that Europe is currently on track to overperforming its pre-2020
40% target yet far from its newest ambition of 55% emissions cuts by 2030, as well as looking at a 1.0–2.35
GtCO2 emissions range in 2050. Aside from the importance of transport electrification, deployment levels of car-
bon capture and storage are found intertwined with deeper emissions cuts and with hydrogen diffusion, with
most hydrogen produced post-2040 being blue. Finally, the multi-model exercise has highlighted benefits
from deeper decarbonisation in terms of energy security and jobs, and moderate to high renewables-
dominated investment needs.
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Since the previous (5th) Assessment Report (AR5) on climate change
mitigation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(IPCC, 2014), the policy landscape hasmarkedly changed, notably orbiting
on the Paris Agreement uniting and binding the globe into a common goal
of limiting global warming to well-below-2 °C above pre-industrial levels
(Peters et al., 2017). Critical products of policy negotiations and resulting
pressures to the IPCC have since shifted the research agenda (Livingston
and Rummukainen, 2020), as also reflected in the integrated assessment
modelling literature, which has now been looking into more ambitious
scenarios in line with the Paris long-term temperature goal (Rogelj et al.,
2018; IPCC, 2018). Novel themes in climate and climate-economymodel-
ling and analysis have recently included but are not limited to a growing
and more thorough assessment of negative emissions technologies
(Minx et al., 2017) and their limitations (Anderson and Peters, 2016),
the role of energy demand (Grubler et al., 2018) and lifestyle shifts (Van
Vuuren et al., 2018), the consideration of trade-offs with other Sustainable
Development Goals (Nerini et al., 2019), an updated view of climate
sensitivity (Sherwood et al., 2020), and a slow departure from unrealistic
no-policy baselines (Hausfather and Peters, 2020; Grant et al., 2020).
Notwithstanding this progress, the modelling world has fallen short of
one promise: to include non-scientists at the heart of its process (Doukas
and Nikas, 2021).
This shortfall has happened in spite of stakeholder-oriented policy-
level initiatives brought about by UNFCCC processes like the Talanoa di-
alogue (Mundaca et al., 2019), numerous relevant calls in the literature
for transdisciplinarity (e.g. Geels et al., 2016; Nikas et al., 2020a; Byrne
et al., 2016) and knowledge co-creation (Mauser et al., 2013) following
longstanding criticisms over stakeholders' role in climate science (Klenk
et al., 2015) and representation in IPCC processes (Yamineva, 2017).
Stakeholders have been involved in non-modelling aspects of climate
science and policy (Galende-Sánchez and Sorman, 2021). In the model-
ling world, both the importance of stakeholders in scenario appraisal
(van Vliet et al., 2020) and the divergence between expert expectations
and modelled pathways (Van Sluisveld et al., 2018) are acknowledged.
There have been certain public consultations in single-model studies
at the national level, towards defining research questions (e.g., Nikas
et al., 2020c), highlighting post-modelling uncertainty dimensions
(e.g., Antosiewicz et al., 2020), or exploiting the merits of mixed-
methods approaches (e.g., Forouli et al., 2019). Yet, not to the point of
claiming society-wide representation or alignment between modelled
outputs and stakeholder preferences (Xexakis et al., 2020). This is
even less so in the resource-intensive global model inter-comparison
projects that essentially form the bedrock of large scientific
assessments like the IPCC's (Nikas et al., 2021). Apart from limited
references to discussions with experts on assessing technological2
potential (Realmonte et al., 2019), collecting national climate policies
(Roelfsema et al., 2020), or reviewing global-level results (Van Soest
et al., 2017), there are nomentions of the word ‘stakeholder’ or ‘expert’
in any other of these global multi-model analyses published after the
Paris Agreement.
Regardless of stakeholder demand for the questions driving them,
the purpose of thesemulti-model exercises is to enhance the robustness
and consistency of resulting insights, by exploiting the strengths of dif-
ferent models and examining how differing modelling theories, struc-
tures, and approaches respond to specific research questions (Doukas
and Nikas, 2020). In fact, embracing this diversity, many such studies
deliberately opt out of, or fail to engage in, harmonising model inputs
(e.g., Edelenbosch et al., 2020 at the global level, or Oshiro et al., 2020
and Sugiyama et al., 2019 at the regional level). To increase the ability
to interpret the results and understand the drivers of the produced
ranges across models, many studies have instead attempted to partially
harmonise assumptions, especially those related with socioeconomic
parameters like economic and population growth (e.g., Gambhir et al.,
2017 at the global level, or Paladugula et al., 2018 and Wang et al.,
2020 at the regional level). Some studies documented efforts to further
investigate harmonised technology or scenario input assumptions along
with shared socioeconomic parameters (e.g., Vrontisi et al., 2018;
Fujimori et al., 2019; Fofrich et al., 2020). Nevertheless, with few excep-
tions of comprehensive efforts (Bosetti et al., 2015; Realmonte et al.,
2019), these exercises have only attempted harmonisation to limited
extents. For example, Luderer et al. (2018) harmonised carbon prices
without focusing on technoeconomic parameters; Butnar et al. (2020)
compared assumptions on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage
(BECCS), without harmonising them; and McCollum et al. (2018) com-
pared energy efficiency investments across models, without harmonising
respective technical and cost parameters. There have not been systematic
efforts in the literature for harmonising emissions, policy, socioeconomic,
technoeconomic, and other parameters, in support of model inter-
comparison projects, to the extent of claiming that resulting ranges of out-
puts can be confidently traced only to the different ‘personalities’ of the
employed models (Doukas et al., 2018).
Narrowing down the geographic focus to Europe, which recently
updated its 2030 target to cutting emissions by 55%, several model-
ling studies have produced scenarios underpinning recent policy
targets (Tsiropoulos et al., 2020). In the post-Paris literature, EU
climate policy and low-carbon pathways have been assessed in
limited single-model regional studies (Simoes et al., 2017; Capros
et al., 2019) or integrative exercises soft-linking models (Vrontisi
et al., 2020), as well as explicitly discussed in global inter-
comparison studies (McCollum et al., 2018; Fragkos et al., 2021).
However, the most recent multi-model endeavour focusing on the
EU, analysing pathways in line with then decarbonisation targets in
1 https://www.sli.do/.
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jections (Capros et al., 2014b), dates before the updated policy ambi-
tion of the Paris Agreement and the highlighted need for stakeholder
inclusiveness and representation.
This study carries out the first multi-model analysis focusing on
Europe exploring implications of current policy projected into the future,
in which both the scenario logic and the research questions have been
informed by stakeholders, and significant socioeconomic and
technoeconomic (as in technology costs) harmonisation efforts have
been undertaken, acknowledging that pure inter-model diversity can
mask toomany different input assumption differences. It is driven by dis-
cussions held in a dedicated stakeholder workshop in Brussels, Belgium,
in November 2019 (Doukas et al., 2020), and employs a comprehensive
protocol for streamlining historical emissions, policy assumptions, socio-
economic parameters, and technology costs to updated datasets (Giarola
et al., 2021a). The study also draws froma global-level implementation of
the resulting scenario protocol, which explores where the world is
headed given countries' current climate action and most recent pledges
(Sognnaes et al., 2021).We expand the latter study's toolset to an ensem-
ble that comprises seven global integrated assessment models (IAMs)
and four European energy, macroeconometric and sectoral models,
while narrowingdown its focus to current Europeanpolicy in order to ad-
dress the stakeholders' research questions.
Section2documents the employedmethods, including anoverviewof
the Brussels stakeholder workshop process and outcomes, the co-design
of the scenario protocol as well as focused research questions formulated
based on the participating stakeholders' priorities, a presentation of the
diversemodelling ensemble, and a transparent discussion of the input as-
sumptions. Section 3 carries out the model inter-comparison exercise
among all models, with the aim to discuss the resulting range of key pa-
rameters including energy CO2 emissions (total and by sector), primary
energy by fuel and final energy by sector, which constitute a cross-
model common denominator. Section 4 presents the results of multi-
model analyses of variables that are relevant to the main themes
prioritised and discussed by stakeholders during the workshop, while
Section 5 discusses the conclusions, caveats, and next steps of the study.
2. Methods and tools
2.1. Co-designing the scenario logic and research questions
As part of the PARIS REINFORCE research project, a regionalworkshop
took place on November 21, 2019, in Brussels, Belgium. It was a pan-
European initiative for the co-production of research underpinning new
climate policy in Europe, drawing from the outcomes of five-month ex-
haustive consultation, inwhich high-level policymakerswere introduced
to the project and asked to provide policy areas that they would be most
interested in research being carried out within. The consultation, along
with an open crowd-sourcing process carried out via an online polling
platform 24 h before the event, resulted in a list of 22 topics, which
were broken down into 3 thematic groups. Stakeholders were invited
based on their displayed participation or interest in previous European
climate policy events, resulting in a sample of over 800 invitations. During
the workshop, high-level staff of the EC directorates-general (DGs) for
energy, climate and research, ministries and climate-related governmen-
tal bodies from EU Member States, international organisations, business
representatives, and scientists participated. 57 individuals attended the
workshop physically, although the event was also livestreamed to allow
as large and diversified an audience as possible.
During the morning sessions, a detailed policy brief on what the
climate-economy models can and cannot do was handed out, pre-
sented, and discussed with stakeholders, and the I2AM PARIS platform
(Nikas et al., 2021) was launched and thoroughly presented, allowing
stakeholders to express their preferences over its final specifications,
content, design, and directions. The afternoon consultation was broken
down into three sessions, in respect to the 3 thematic groups of the 223
topics. During each session, a chairperson spent the first 10 min
explaining each potential research area to the audience, then allowing
participants to vote (via sli.do1) on and prioritise which questions
they would be most interested in discussing. Given the range of pro-
posed questions, this process was important to enable discussions to
be held over the most important topics to the stakeholders. After topic
selection, the floor was open for discussion between chairs and audi-
ence. Chairs spent 1–2 min introducing the discussion on each topic,
and then stakeholders were able to raise any points or questions they
had over the proposed research areas. Following the discussion, sli.do
voting again allowed stakeholders to vote according to how relevant
they see it for the project to follow up on and conduct research in
each topic. The process is illustrated in Fig. 1.
During the first thematic session (‘global threat, global pathways’),
among the topics presented stakeholders chose to discuss behavioural
change and potential failure of key technologies along with game-
changing innovations; after a detailed discussion, the themes selected
for the project to carry out research within included the three topics
along with a realistic account of where the world is headed given collec-
tive current efforts and pledges. In the second session (‘a Paris-consistent
Europe’), despite the expected diversity in preferences among stake-
holder groups, academics and non-academics alike highlighted questions
revolving around electrification and hydrogen. In the final session (‘sus-
tainable climate action’), although scientists were mostly interested in
the decline of carbon-intensive sectors and distributional impacts across
Europe, non-academic stakeholders upvoted issues oriented on cross-
sectoral impacts revolving around employment and investments.
Among the outcomes of the workshop, the prospect of understand-
ing and realistically quantifying where the world and Europe are head-
ing given current policy was not selected for discussion during the first
thematic session, indicating that stakeholders understood the rationale
and motivation behind it. Nonetheless, in the subsequent voting pro-
cess, the topicwas prioritised by the stakeholders as a research question
for the modelling exercise to investigate, among others. This further
highlighted a gap in the literature: pathways implied by current policies
forward to 2050, explicitly considering the level of ambition
encompassed in those policies and targets, are underrepresented in
the modelling world—or non-existent for the European region, as
discussed in Section 1. Most of the literature explores different mitiga-
tion trajectories consistent with a 2 °C- or 1.5 °C-interpretation of the
Paris Agreement, in ‘backcasting’ approaches, in which models set out
to describe what is needed from a technology and policy perspective,
compared against unrealistic no-policy baselines (Grant et al., 2020)
or relatively simplistic reference scenarios describing how emissions
would develop in the future given the existing climate policies
(e.g., McCollum et al., 2018; Roelfsema et al., 2020).
To design a scenario framework (SF) addressing this gap, we start
from current EU policies, as documented until 2020 in Roelfsema et al.
(2020), and update them accordingly with the policies currently in
place. To interpret and measure mitigation effort, we use carbon price as
a proxy of climate policy. We first calculate the carbon price in the EU
that, absent any other policy, achieves the same levels of emissions as cur-
rent policy by 2030. To extendmitigation effort post-2030,we extend this
equivalent carbon price at the rate of GDP growth per capita after 2030, to
represent a constant economic burden from carbon pricing (Strefler et al.,
2021), as proxied by the ratio of carbon price to per capita income over
time: for models with detailed energy system representations, current
policies are simulated as constraints; for some macroeconomic models,
they are instead applied as minimum subsidy levels to low-carbon tech-
nologies, boosting their uptake (for a detailed discussion of the scenario
protocol see Sognnaes et al., 2021 and Appendix A). With this SF as a
starting point, we map and group the prioritised topics in the resulting
co-designed research questions (RQs), as described in Table 1.
Fig. 1. Stakeholder engagement process and development of scenario framework and research questions.
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For the purposes of this study, we employ eleven models: seven
global with explicit disaggregation of the European region, and four re-
gional covering Europe in detail at the national level. We seek toTable 1
Mapping of stakeholder-selected topics with the scenario framework (SF) and research
questions (RQs) of the study.
Workshop
thematic sessions




- Where is the world
headed? (SF)
RQ1: Where is Europe headed in
2050: what do its middle-of-century
emissions and energy mix look like,
as a result of its current efforts?
(Section 3)
- Potential failure of
key technologies
RQ2a: What is the role of carbon
capture and storage as a game
changer? (Section 4.1.1)












- The role of
electrification and
storage
RQ3a: What will the role of
electrification be in the transport
sector? (Section 4.2.1)
RQ3b: What is the future of (grey,
blue, and green) hydrogen in the EU,
given its current policy? How does it
fare against electrification?
(Section 4.2.2)











RQ4: What are the costs and gains of
current policy? What are the
necessary investments to deliver on
it? What are the employment
implications of current EU policy?
(Section 4.3)
4
enhance the robustness of results by exploiting the diversity of the
modelling ensemble of this multi-model exercise: following the classifi-
cation scheme of Nikas et al. (2019), the ensemble comprises two global
general equilibrium IAMs (GEMINI-E3, ICES); two global partial equilib-
rium IAMs (GCAM, TIAM); one regional (EU-TIMES) and two global
(MUSE, 42) energy system models; one regional (NEMESIS) and one
global (E3ME) macroeconometric models; and two regional sectoral
models, one for transport (ALADIN) and one for the residential and in-
dustry sectors (FORECAST). The models, along with their classification,
coverage and description are presented in Appendix B; full documenta-
tion of the eleven models can be found in the I2AM PARIS platform.2
2.3. Modelling inputs and assumptions
Towards enhancing the robustness of modelling outputs, to the ex-
tent of tracing resulting ranges to the structural and theoretical differ-
ences among this heterogeneous group of models, significant efforts
were made to streamline and transparently document input variables
across models. We use a comprehensive methodology for reducing
model response undesired heterogeneity (i.e., heterogeneity that can-
not be attributed to model diversity but different assumptions), de-
scribed by Giarola et al. (2021a), focusing on Europe (EU-27, plus UK,
EU hereinafter) (Table 2).3
It should be noted that the global models were run at the global
level, employing similar harmonisation efforts and policy implementa-
tion for all regions of the world, as documented in Giarola et al.
(2021a). In contrast to regional modelling runs that consider national
specificity, regional technical (resource and storage) potential, and re-
gional directives and effort sharing decisions, the global models con-
sider inter-regional implications. These differences in scope and detail
are considered in the following analysis. Furthermore, we do not2 https://www.i2am-paris.eu/.
3 A detailed harmonisation table can be found in the I2AMPARISworkspace of this anal-
ysis at: https://www.i2am-paris.eu/pr_wwh/harmonisation_table.
Table 2




Historical emissions We align, or check for consistency, historical emissions across models with the Community Emissions Data System for CO2, CH4, and pollutants
(Hoesly et al., 2018), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for fluorinated gases (World Meteorological Organization, 2018),
and the PRIMAP dataset for N2O (Gütschow et al., 2016), while for the four regional models (EU-TIMES, NEMESIS, FORECAST, ALADIN) we
harmonise to, or check for consistency against, the annual EU GHG inventory (European Environmental Agency, 2019).
Socioeconomic parameters We harmonise socioeconomic assumptions, using the EUROPOP database for population (European Commission, 2020c) and the 2018 Ageing
Report for GDP per capita (European Commission, 2017).
Technoeconomic parameters We share and/or check values for consistency in technoeconomic assumptions for representative technologies, based on the European National
Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) reports (Mantzos et al., 2017) for power and buildings, on the TIAM database (Napp et al., 2019) and the
National Renewable Energy Lab electrification futures study (Jadun et al., 2017) for transport, and on Voldsund et al. (2019) and Gardarsdottir
et al. (2019) for CCS-integrated industrial technologies.
Other variables Depending on the model structure and representation as inputs, we use different sources to harmonise other variables—for example, we
harmonise sectoral value added for FORECAST, EU-TIMES, E3ME and ICES based on Eurostat (European Commission, 2020c), fossil fuel prices for
FORECAST, EU-TIMES, NEMESIS, ICES, GEMINI-E3 and E3ME based on the 2019 World Energy Outlook “Current Policies” (International Energy
Agency, 2019), exchange and interest rates for NEMESIS and E3ME based on the 2018 OECD Economic Outlook (OECD, 2018), etc.
Policies We use a shared database of current policies in the EU, building on and expanding the CD-Links project databasea. This database is available in the
Supplementary Material. For other region's policies, as implemented in the global models, see Supplementary Material 6 in Giarola et al., 2021a).
a https://www.climatepolicydatabase.org/.
4 CCS in power generation and industry, hydrogen, direct air capture, etc., see also Sec-
tions 4.1.1 & 4.2.2.
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the aim of this exercise is exactly to produce a representative and real-
istic baseline that reflects current policy efforts and their projection for-
ward. As such, we report our findings in absolute terms rather than in
terms of impacts relative to a baseline. Exceptions include comparison
against historical data (e.g., 1990 as a reference point for emissions),
shares of fuelmixes in a given year, or employment implications against
model-specific no-policy baselines that serve as a limited effort to ad-
dress respective stakeholders' concerns.
3. An inter-comparison study of EU emissions and energy system in
2050
In response to the stakeholders' interest in a targeted and detailed
account of ‘where Europe is headed’ given its current policy efforts,
the co-designed scenario framework allows projecting EU climate
change mitigation-related indicators assuming these efforts are extrap-
olated into the future based on growth per capita, but not further rein-
forced. For this purpose, we begin with an analysis of a set of key cross-
model common indicators for the EU region: total CO2 emissions from
energy (i.e., fossil fuel combustion), CO2 emissions from energy by sec-
tor, primary energy by fuel and final energy by sector.
3.1. CO2 emissions from energy
Except for the two sector-specificmodels, ALADIN and FORECAST, all
other models deliver outlooks of total EU CO2 emissions from energy
(Fig. 2a). From 1990 to 2015, annual CO2 emissions in the EU have de-
creased from 4.12 to 3.26 Gt, an average decline of 0.9% per year. Since
2005, themore stringent climate regulation via the EU Emission Trading
System (EU ETS) (European Parliament and Council, 2003) has resulted
in an accelerated decline (2% per year). Between 2020 and 2030,models
project on average a slight reinforcement of the CO2 emissions reduc-
tion rate and an absolute reduction compared to 1990 ranging from
−33% to −45%. Assuming a range of non-CO2 emissions between 0.5
and 0.67 MtCO2eq. in 2030 (European Commission, 2019, 2020d), the
corresponding CO2 emissions from energy should be between 2.9 and
2.7 Gt to reach the now-outdated EU target of −40% of GHG emissions
reduction in 2030 compared with 1990 (European Council, 2014).
Expectedly, all nine models show the EU will reach the former −40%
milestone; but, more importantly, almost all models display
overperformance, given the current policies in place. With these
estimates for non-CO2 emissions (excluding land-use), GHG emissions
reduction in 2030 will range between −39% and −51%, compared to5
1990 levels, which is insufficient to comply with the new EU Green
Deal objective of a 55% GHG reduction target (European Commission,
2020d). These results on energy CO2 emissions are in line with existing
scenarios in the literature (European Commission, 2016; Mantzos et al.,
2019) that range between 2.8 and 2.9 Gt. After 2030, the average annual
rate of CO2 emissions decline is lower, except for GCAM and MUSE, for
which the decarbonisation rate is stronger.
The key takeaway here is that median EU CO2 emissions in 2050 are
about 2.1 Gt, with a broad range of about 1.0–2.35 Gt, representing a
CO2 emissions drop of −43% to −76% compared to 1990. This inter-
comparison showcases that, of the models capable of projecting until
2050 (i.e., excluding 42), the three global partial equilibrium models
(TIAM, MUSE and GCAM) are more optimistic in the longer run
(0.97–1.66 GtCO2), compared to the global CGEmodels and the regional
EU models (2.11–2.35 GtCO2). This is mainly due to a higher flexibility
in terms of available mitigation options in these models, considering
the availability of advanced decarbonisation technologies4 as well as
the larger technical potential of key technologies (e.g., biomass, solar,
and wind). By contrast, EU regional models contain more granular as-
sessments about technical potentials of specific technologies (e.g., CO2
storage, biomass, solar, andwind),market barriers, and specific national
policies (e.g., national restrictions to CCS applications), thereby offering
a critical ‘reality check’ on global models.
By sector, the reduction of energy CO2 emissions (Fig. 2b) shows
similar patterns across models and time, despite significant variability.
Energy supply is the largest contributor of emissions cuts between
2020 and 2050 in almost all models, with GCAM even showcasing neg-
ative emissions in 2050. ThemedianCO2 emissions fromEU energy sup-
ply declines by 47% between 2020 and 2050. Median decarbonisation
rates in industry (42%), buildings (30%) and transport (32%), between
2020 and 2050, are relatively similar but differ significantly across
models. It is noteworthy that the two sector-specific models,
FORECAST (buildings and industry) and ALADIN (transport) show sig-
nificant emissions cuts in their sectors, compared to other models. For
example, CO2 emissions from the built environment decline by 45% in
FORECAST but remain relatively stable in GEMINI-E3. Similarly, mid-
century transport decarbonisation reaches 80% in comparison with
2020 levels in ALADIN but remains moderate (below 35%) in many
other models. Finally, industrial CO2 emissions display the largest vari-
ability, a large reduction of above 40% in FORECAST, GCAM, NEMESIS
and TIAM, even reaching zero emissions in MUSE, and again moderate
decarbonisation in GEMINI-E3.
(a) Trajectory of total energy CO2 emissions


















































































































































































Transportaon AFOFI & Other
Fig. 2.CO2 emissions fromenergy in the EU acrossmodels, (a) total values until 2050—black dotted line: historical data fromEuropeanEnvironmental Agency (2020); (b) by sector in 2010
(historical values), 2020, 2030, 2040, and 2050. “AFOFI & Other” includes emissions from fossil fuels combustion in the agriculture, fisheries and forestry, as well as other emissions not
allocated, fuel fugitive emissions are accounted in ‘supply’. Despite harmonisation, allocation by sector can slightly differ according to models due to different sector granularity. For the
42 model, 2045 values are displayed instead of 2050.
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From an energy perspective, eight models detail EU primary energy
by fuel (Fig. 3a). The 2020–2050 evolution of total primary energy con-
sumption differs among models. Global macroeconomic models show
an increase (13%–24%); EU-TIMES and GCAM project relative stability
whereas 42, MUSE, NEMESIS, and TIAM show a decline instead. Theme-
dian value of allmodels for EU primary energy in 2020 is 67.7 EJ/y—i.e., a
moderate reduction compared to 2010 (70 EJ/y). It then continues to
decline until 2030 (59.9 EJ/y), before slightly growing to remain rela-
tively stable onwards (61.3 EJ/y in 2050). These numbers are in line
with existing projections of primary consumption (European Commis-
sion, 2016; Mantzos et al., 2019) that are around 60 in 2030 and
54–58 EJ/y in 2050. Despite this variance on the projections of future
EU energy efficiency, all models foresee decarbonisation of the EU en-
ergy system, with a median CO2 emissions intensity declining from
48.3 kgCO2/GJ in 2020 to 30.5 kgCO2/GJ in 2050. This drop ranges across
models, from −16% to −68%, with technology-rich models showing
steeper decarbonisation compared to macroeconomic (CGE and
macroeconometric) models. Only TIAM from the entire ensemble
reaches the EU 2030 energy efficiency target of at least 32.5% cuts
(translated into 53.3 EJ/y in primary energy consumption), followed6
by NEMESIS coming relatively close to the target. This highlights that,
for most models, the 2030 EU efficiency target requires further efforts
and, to some extent, ismore constraining than the respectiveGHGemis-
sions reduction target (Aune and Golombek, 2021).
Projections of primary energy consumption by fuel show similar be-
haviour as far as the evolution of the shares of fossil fuels and renewable
energy sources (RES) in the EU primary energy mix is concerned. The
former declines in all models, from 59 to 86% in 2020 to 36–71% in
2050. As the EU is a net importer of fossil fuels (especially so for oil
and gas), these results hint at higher energy security in the future, de-
spite the modelled policy strength falling significantly short of meeting
the EU's net-zero emissions 2050 goal. Among the models, this decline
of fossil fuel consumption takes different forms. This stands also
among energy models: in EU-TIMES, part of the decline of oil and coal
consumption is balanced by an increase in gas consumption, of which
about 9% is used in carbon capture and storage (CCS) plants by 2050;
in 42, on the other hand, gas consumption remains relatively stable be-
tween 2020 and 2045whereas coal and oil consumption displays strong
reductions; while MUSE projects a significant reduction of oil and gas
but shows an increase in coal. In TIAM, coal consumption displays
bolder cuts by 2050 (−81%). The share of RES (biomass, hydro, solar
and wind energy) grows moderately in all models, with an EU median
(a) Primary energy consumption by fuel
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Fig. 3. The EU energy system in 2010 (historical values calculated by authors based on Eurostat, 2021), 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050: (a) primary energy consumption by fuel (‘other’may
include municipal/industrial solid waste, etc.); and (b) final energy consumption by sector. Despite harmonisation, allocation by fuel/sector can slightly differ according to models due to
different fuel/sector granularity. For the 42 model, 2045 values are displayed instead of 2050.
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and wind consumption show significant growth in the same period—
400% and 84%, respectively. Median values for hydro power consump-
tion remain relatively constant, although projections among models
vary: E3ME projects a decline, whereas others (EU-TIMES, MUSE, and
particularly ICES) project a significative increase. Biomass consumption
grows moderately in four models (E3ME, EU-TIMES, NEMESIS, and
TIAM), and significantly in GCAM (almost doubling), but remains con-
stant in 42 and drops in MUSE. Finally, models show a relatively stable
nuclear share in the EU fuel mix with negligible changes overall. This
technology and fuel share analysis highlights how, even with closely
harmonised technoeconomic assumptions, there remains considerable
inter-model diversity of results. While a full understanding of these dif-
ferences is outside the scope of this study, it demonstrates that not just
technoeconomic details, but others such as substitutability between
technologies, technology availability and sectoral granularity all need
fuller inter-comparison. In the meantime, the model diversity serves
as a useful tool in exploring a significant share of the future possibility
space.
From 2020 to 2030, the eight models overall project a reduction of
total final energy consumption (by 1–24%) (Fig. 3b). Nevertheless, by
2050, total final energy varies significantly in terms of model behaviour,7
as well as within classes (except for macroeconometric models that
consistently project reduction). It either declines boldly (E3ME, 42,
MUSE andNEMESIS; aswell as ALADIN for transport only) or showcases
initial drops followed by rebounds, which are either late and moderate
(EU-TIMES and GCAM) or early and significant (ICES and TIAM). In
2020, models' median values have grown since 2010, from 46.2 to 48
EJ/y. Thereafter, the median value of EU final energy consumption de-
clines up to 2030 (44.5 EJ/y), before stabilising until 2050. Breaking it
down by sector, the median final energy consumption of EU industry
is slightly lower in 2050 than in 2020. EU-TIMES, ICES and TIAM project
increasing final energy in industry, while MUSE and NEMESIS expect a
reduction. In the building sector, only ICES andNEMESIS project a grow-
ing final energy consumption in 2050: the median value is 17.5 EJ/y in
2020 (down 13% from 2010), then slightly declines in 2030 and remains
relatively stable thereafter. For transportation, all models show a reduc-
tion in energy consumption by 2050, down by almost a half in ALADIN
and TIAM; a third in NEMESIS and ICES; a quarter in 42; and less so in
E3ME, EU-TIMES, GCAM and MUSE.
Despite important heterogeneity among models, this analysis of
cross-model common denominator indicators shows many similar be-
haviours for the EU region. The modelling ensemble overall shows sig-
nificant CO2 emissions reductions in 2030, overperforming the EU's
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the new EU Green Deal target (−55%). The energy supply sector is con-
sistently the top contributor to decarbonisation by 2050. Furthermore,
the share of fossil fuels in the EU energymix is robustly—yet with differ-
ent implications for other technologies across models—projected to sig-
nificantly drop by 2050, in contrast to renewables and in particular solar
and wind energy growing, quintupling and doubling by 2050
respectively.
4. A multi-model approach to addressing stakeholders' questions
In this section, we delve into each of the research questions co-
designed with stakeholders (Table 1), after grouping their concerns
and topics of interest, in multi-model settings, depending on the capa-
bilities of the employed models.
4.1. Potential failure of key technologies
4.1.1. The role of CCS as a game changer
CCS is considered a possible option for abating CO2 emissions, partic-
ularly from power generation as well as other hard-to-decarbonise sec-
tors, like heavy industries and energy transformation. However, barriers
still exist and hinder large-scale development of these technologies,
which are not yet at market deployment stage due to various technical
andnon-technical reasons (Budinis et al., 2018). The role of this possible
game-changing technology is explored in seven of the employed
models: E3ME, EU-TIMES, GCAM, GEMINI-E3, MUSE, NEMESIS, and
TIAM. Apart from GEMINI-E3 and NEMESIS (partly reflecting limited
decarbonisation resulting from current policy efforts, and for GEMINI-
E3 also less detailed representation of the technology in power genera-
tion), even in this scenario representing a moderate increase in climate
policy strength in line with economic growth, all models foresee an ac-
tive role of the technology, mainly post-2040, although to different(a) CCS-captured CO2 by sector vs. CO2 emitted
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Fig. 4. CO2 captured by CCS (a) by sector (left-hand axis) vs. total CO2 emitted (right-hand
axis), and (b) against CO2 reduction levels (since 1990, based on European Environmental
Agency, 2019).
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extents (Fig. 4a). E3ME and EU-TIMES show a lower rate of CCS penetra-
tion in electricity generation, reaching a capture rate of 102 and
170 MtCO2/y in 2050, respectively, while the global, technology-rich
models TIAM, GCAM and MUSE deliver high capture rates, on average
630 MtCO2/y by 2050. As discussed in Section 3, these three models
show deeper emissions cuts, and this is largely attributed to their
technological richness, the relatively larger potential of low-carbon
technologies, model capabilities, and as shown here the flexibility for
CCS to penetrate the electricity mix and be deployed in other sectors
(mainly industry). Except for EU-TIMES, according to which bioenergy
with CCS (BECCS) penetrates only from 2050 (contributing to 12% of
captured CO2), in global models (TIAM, GCAM, and E3ME) BECCS pene-
trate at earlier stages. On average, contribution of BECCS in thesemodels
represents approximately 50% of captured CO2 in 2030 and 56% in 2050.
Comparing results in absolute terms hints that the way in which the
different models foresee emissions reductions when extrapolating the
current policy framework using the carbon price equivalent also influ-
ence the absolute deployment of CCS plants: expectedly, higher CCS de-
ployment allows bolder decarbonisation of the system. Combining CO2
capture rates with CO2 emissions cuts compared to 1990 (Fig. 4b) also
allows to compare CCS adoption rates with climate policy ambition, il-
lustrating at what point of currently mobilised decarbonisation this
technology is required to further progress, thereby possibly hinting lim-
itations of mitigation in Europe without its at-scale deployment.
Regardless of the number of CCS plants available, in E3ME, the technol-
ogy comes into play already from low decarbonisation levels, with a
growing yet limited contribution, contrary to all other models: EU-
TIMES suggests a later, steep increase but with a high penetration rate
onwards considering the limited decarbonisation foreseen in the
model; in the global, technology-rich models (GCAM, TIAM and
MUSE), CCS is a critical factor and game-changing enabler of the deep
decarbonisation foreseen, but it becomes so only upon hitting high
decarbonisation levels (40–60%). Results from these models are in line
with scenarios underpinning recent policy targets (Tsiropoulos et al.,
2020), despite the latter looking into more ambitious action (80% cuts
to net zero in 2050).
Our results justify stakeholders' concerns over the potential failure
of CCS as a game changer in the EU energy system.We see that, without
setting in motion actions to deliver on the EU's increased climate ambi-
tions, as reflected in its December 2020 NDC and broader mid-century
vision for climate neutrality, CCS deployment is critical to achieving
deep emissions cuts and eventually nearing climate targets (Bui et al.,
2018; Korkmaz et al., 2020). The technology's at-scale deployment has
long been considered critical, yet dependent on broader policy efforts
(Dalla Longa et al., 2020), enabling factors in infrastructure and capi-
tal/fuel markets (Odenberger and Johnsson, 2010), and the interplay
with the evolution of other low-carbon technologies (Simoes et al.,
2017). There exist other critical social/socioeconomic factors weighing
in the success of an impactful CCS strategy in the EU, someofwhich can-
not be integrated in typical integrated assessment modelling frame-
works: social acceptance of such plants at the local level, for example,
is deemed critical for the technology's successful deployment in
Europe (d'Amore et al., 2020). Our results should be interpreted along-
side the adopted scenario framework; different policy efforts may
completely change the role of CCS even in the longer run
(e.g., Vrontisi et al., 2020).
4.1.2. Security of supply across the EU: the role of import dependency
Besides decarbonisation dimensions, energy security is also an area
of interest for stakeholders on moving towards a sustainable energy
transition. Here, we look at energy security and import dependency
for a European energy system that changes in line with current policy
efforts projected in the longer term. Currently the EU is a net importer
of fossil fuels and expected to rely much more on gas and less on coal
and oil in the future (European Commission, 2020a). Some Member
States have acknowledged the importance of improving energy
Table 3
EU system import dependency (%imports/PEC).
EU-TIMES GEMINI-E3 TIAM
2020 −62.5% −58.6% −56.2%
2030 −58% −59% −47%
2040 −60% −59% −42%
2050 −61.9% −59.2% −31.5%
(a) Fossil fuel imports
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Fig. 5. Fossil fuel imports under current policy efforts: (a) imported fuels until 2050; and
(b) import dependency in relation to CO2 emissions reduction levels (since 1990, based
on European Environmental Agency, 2019).
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domestic renewables to reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports. However,
it is also important to have specific policies to guarantee security of sup-
ply, by diversifying fossil supply routes, and avoiding a simple switch
from the import of fossil fuel to another (e.g., Nikas et al., 2020b;
Antosiewicz et al., 2020).
Some energy security-related insights can be analysed comparing
results from global models GEMINI-E3 and TIAM, and the regional
EU-TIMES model. Total import dependency (estimated as the ratio
of imported energy sources to total primary energy) is projected
steady until the middle of the century in EU-TIMES (62%) and
GEMINI-E3 (59%), while in TIAM it decreases to slightly above 30%
(Table 3).
The decarbonisation achieved in 2050, under current policy sce-
narios, is accompanied by a stable projected primary energy in EU-
TIMES compared to 2020. Despite growing energy service demands
in the next decades, energy efficiency is expected to contribute to
decoupling GDP (increasing by ~50%) from energy consumption.
This effect is even more pronounced in the TIAM and GEMINI-E3
models, where primary energy is projected to decrease by ~15%
compared to 2020 values. Furthermore, in all models, use of fossil
fuels decreases, though to different extents. Comparing different
resources, all models agree that oil and coal imports will decrease
between 2020 and 2050, while natural gas outlooks differ across
models and levels of ambition. Gas imports increase with an aver-
age rate of 0.7–2%/y (EU-TIMES and GEMINI-E3 respectively),
while in TIAM it tends to reduce in the long run (−0.8%/y) but re-
tains some important role in the transition (Fig. 5a). In contrast to
declining fossil fuel dependence, biomass use increases moderately
in EU-TIMES (0.34%/y) and TIAM (0.6%/y)— it is unavailable in
GEMINI-E3. Biomass imports are available in EU-TIMES, yet negligi-
ble (~2.4% of biomass primary energy in 2050).
Comparing total import dependency with the decarbonisation
achieved allows assessing how energy source imports may be af-
fected by mitigation efforts. Fig. 5b shows that, in the global partial
equilibrium models, import dependency decreases in time, in line
with decarbonisation efforts, thereby attesting to future low-
carbon energy systems relying less and less on imports, substituted
primarily by energy savings and domestic energy resources. It is
noteworthy that costs of fossil fuels in other regions are calculated
endogenously in global models, but exogenously in the regional
model.
4.2. Electrification and hydrogen
4.2.1. The role of electrification in transportation
Globally, the transport sector is in a critical transition (Koasidis
et al., 2020a). Despite efficiency improvements, electrification and
greater use of biofuels, global transport emissions have been increas-
ing, making up a quarter of direct CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion, with road transport remaining the largest source
(International Energy Agency, 2020b). In the EU, although transport
emissions have stabilised after steady growth until 2007 (European
Environmental Agency, 2019), they still make up 29.6% of total direct
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion. Electric vehicles (EVs) are
considered a valuable option to reduce direct emissions and9
energy intensity of road mode, and their deployment is steeply
growing (International Energy Agency, 2020a). Here, drawing from
stakeholders' concerns, we explore the extent to which electrifica-
tion plays a role in the future EU total transport sector, comparing
scenario results from the entire modelling ensemble, except FORE-
CAST. All ten models foresee a growth of electricity penetration in
transport (Fig. 6a). In 2030, the share of electricity in transport
total final energy ranges in 1–10%, rising to 7–37% in 2050. In abso-
lute terms, electricity consumption is foreseen to grow in the sector
with an annual rate of 3–12%/y between 2020 and 2050. Fig. 6b fur-
ther underpins a relation between transport electrification and en-
ergy system decarbonisation. The EU-TIMES, E3ME, NEMESIS, 42,
GEMINI-E3, TIAM and ICES models showcase a steeper increase of
electrification with decarbonisation, while GCAM and MUSE show a
slightly lower slope. Moreover, ALADIN (excluded from the figure,
being a sectoral model) suggests that electricity dominates the sec-
tor when sectoral CO2 emissions drop by at least 39% compared to
1990.
4.2.2. The future of hydrogen in the EU, given its current policy efforts
Most hydrogen is currently used in oil refining and chemical produc-
tion, producedwith fossil fuel processes, namely grey/brown hydrogen.
In a low-carbon future, hydrogen is generally expected to grow,
becoming a leading energy vector to sustain decarbonisation of hard-
to-electrify demand sectors, like heavy-duty transportation, navigation,
aviation, and energy-intensive industries (Koasidis et al., 2020b), or
used for energy storage (European Commission, 2020b) sustaining the
uptake of large RES shares in the power sector. The deployment of
sustainable hydrogen using fossil fuels with CCS or renewable electric-
ity, namely blue or green hydrogen respectively, is strictly related to
innovations in technologies like CCS, energy storage, electrolysers,
fuels cells, etc.
(a) Electricity in EU transport final energy consumption
(b) Transport electrification vs. CO2 emissions cuts
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Fig. 6. EU transport sector electrification: (a) in final energy consumption in 2020, 2030, 2040 and 2050; and (b) in relation to CO2 emissions reduction levels (since 1990, based on
European Environmental Agency, 2019).
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coming from stakeholders and investigate what role, in a context of
current policy efforts being projected in the future, is foreseen for hy-
drogen, its production pathways and performance against electricity.
The hydrogen chain is included in five models5: GCAM, TIAM, and EU-
TIMES, in which an explicit representation of both supply (hydrogen
production and transformation) and demand side is available; and the
ALADIN and FORECAST sectoral models, where only demand sectors
are represented. Concerning hydrogen supply, EU-TIMES, GCAM and
TIAM (Fig. 7a) foresee increasing amounts of hydrogen production
from 2030 onwards, yet still marginal compared to electricity: in
2050, hydrogen production is on average 94% lower than electricity.
However, results hint a transition in hydrogen production: while most
hydrogen is expected to be grey in 2030, by 2050 themodels show con-
version to blue hydrogen, underpinning the increase of natural gas in
the energy system, and to a lesser extent to green. These findings indi-
cate that current policies are not enough to drive a complete change
from grey towards green hydrogen in EU by 2050, also highlighting5 MUSE also covers the hydrogen chain, but it eventually did not play role in the results
to report it.
10the role of natural gas as more than a transition fuel in two of these
models (see Section 4.1.2).
Focusing on demand, in the industry sector (Fig. 7b), the share of
hydrogen grows moderately in the models, delivering on average 1%
of total sector consumption in 2030 and 3.5% in 2050, remaining neg-
ligible against electricity. In transport, only TIAM shows important
hydrogen deployment, delivering 7% of total consumption in 2030
and 17% in 2050. In all other models, hydrogen remains a niche tech-
nology achieving in 2050 an average of 0.7% of consumption. Despite
differences amongmodelling results, in a scenario projecting current
policy efforts into the future, electricity is foreseen to significantly
outperform hydrogen, which will have limited applications mainly
in industry. Comparing the penetration of electricity and hydrogen
with delivered decarbonisation (Fig. 7c) shows that hydrogen
comes into play with higher level of decarbonisation compared to
electricity: higher than 38% (relative to 1990 levels) in EU-TIMES,
42% for TIAM and 47% for GCAM. The two sectoral models confirm
this finding: ALADIN quantifies a 39% emissions reduction in trans-
port before seeing any hydrogen emerging, and FORECAST foresees
hydrogen penetrating in industry when a minimum level of 30%
emissions cuts is achieved.
(a) Hydrogen production by fuel
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Fig. 7. Projected hydrogen production in the EU (a) by fuel in final demand; as well as
compared to electricity (b) in final transport and industry demand and (c) in relation to
CO2 emissions reduction levels (since 1990, based on European Environmental Agency,
2019).
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Common practice in the literature suggests that the socioeconomic
impact of climate action in a region be analysed by comparing against
a counterfactual or ‘reference’ scenario (for Europe, e.g., Vielle, 2020;
Vrontisi et al., 2020). The scenario framework adopted in this study,
however, in response to criticisms in the literature over the absence of
meaningful such trajectories (Hausfather and Peters, 2020; Grant
et al., 2020), aims to develop—and focuses explicitly on—such a refer-
ence baseline scenario. This means that no counterfactual scenario has
been designed, employed, and compared against for the purposes of
this modelling exercise. Nevertheless, a limited effort is made in this
section to touch upon this concern raised by the stakeholders, based
on the macroeconomic models of the employed ensemble: these can
deliver information on the policy costs of the scenarios modelled, refer-
ring to their own no-policy counterfactual trajectories, which are there-
fore not harmonised across the models. Among these, the two global11CGE models (GEMINI-E3 and ICES) show negative GDP impacts of cur-
rent policy efforts, relative to their no policy counterfactuals, when
these are extrapolated into the future. The two macroeconometric
models, on the other hand, display different behaviour: NEMESIS
shows negligible GDP impacts, while E3ME projects positive impacts
on GDP, which however do not consider potential reductions of climate
change damages. Among the many theoretical differences between the
two modelling approaches (Robinson, 2006), this gap can be attributed
to the way capital markets are modelled (Pollitt andMercure, 2018): in
general equilibrium models, interest rates balance the resources used
for investments and the savings, implying an important ‘crowding-
out’ or eviction effect of mitigation-related investments against other
investments; inmacroeconometricmodels, on the other hand, this evic-
tion effect ismoderate because there ismonetary creation. Furthermore,
between the two macroeconometric models used here, NEMESIS is an
EU model while E3ME is a global model, meaning that the latter con-
siders current policy efforts across the globe and therefore inter-
regional impacts—i.e., the implications of non-EU climate action on the
EU economy.
Similarly, in terms of employment, in the absence of a
harmonised counterfactual scenario across models, we can only dis-
cuss certain insights of the current EU policies' impact on employ-
ment relative to a no-policy counterfactual, of which only the
macroeconometric models allow a qualitative analysis, given their
disaggregation level in the labour market (Nikas et al., 2019). The
two models show relatively similar results, with positive impact of
a long-term projection of current policy efforts on total employment.
Both showcase positive employment impacts on manufacturing and
negative on the energy sector, but E3ME projects negligible implica-
tions for energy-intensive industries, contrary to the negative im-
pacts in NEMESIS. The global E3ME model also forecasts new jobs
created in the services sector but employment losses in agriculture,
with NEMESIS showing negligible and positive impacts, respectively.
Again, these impacts are stated relative to a no-policy counterfactual,
which itself does not consider any negative jobs implications from
climate change damages.
Apart from this qualitative analysis, we extract some quantitative in-
dicators across models providing insights into the economic impacts of
current EU climate policies, namely in terms of energy investments
(Fig. 8a). Only two models calculate annual investments in the broader
energy supply sector, showcasing either a relative stability over time
(NEMESIS) or a moderate increase (GEMINI-E3). Three more models
complement them in terms of investments in power generation
(E3ME, EU-TIMES, and GCAM). Here, again, we can see differences in
terms of evolution or absolute values, depending on themodel perspec-
tive. Despite differences in the levels of investments overall, top-down
macroeconomic models show moderate changes between 2020 and
2050: a slight increase in NEMESIS, from 89 to 97 bn€2010/y, and a
sharper one in GEMINI-E3, from65 to 88 bn€2010/y; and a near-termde-
cline in the next decade in E3ME, from 127 to 98 bn€2010/y, before a re-
bound to 124 bn€2010/y in 2050. On the other hand, the technology-
richer models project an acceleration of European investments in
the power sector from 2020 to 2050: both EU-TIMES and GCAM
showcase a 2.5-fold increase, with the former calculating an invest-
ment of ~136 bn€2010/y in 2050 and the latter an impressive 400 bn
€2010/y for the same year, reflecting the stronger decarbonisation of
the energy sector (see Section 3). Except for GCAM, these values
are relatively coherent with Zhou et al. (2019) and slightly higher
than Capros et al. (2018).
The two technologically detailed models also capture the invest-
ment requirements by power generation technology (Fig. 8b). In accor-
dance with fuel evolution (see Section 3), RES-related investments
dominate the mix, followed by nuclear. Solar power generation in
GCAM represents one-third of overall investments in electricity in
2020 and two-thirds in 2050 (from 50 to 270 bn€2010/y). In EU-TIMES,
wind investments reach 50 bn€2010/y in 2050, corresponding to one-
(a) Investments in energy supply and power generation
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Fig. 8. Investments (a) in energy supply and power generation by model, (b) disaggregated by technology in EU-TIMES and GCAM.
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models, with up to 36 bn€2010/y in 2050. Finally, investments in CCS-
integrated power are relatively moderate in EU-TIMES (4 bn€2010/y in
2050) but significant in GCAM (48 and 36 bn€2010/y in 2040 and 2050,
respectively), hinting the importance of CCS deployment in the
decarbonisation of the electricity sector (see Section 4.1.1).
5. Conclusions
In the literature, the climate policy scenario space is crowded and
yet very little of that space traces back to what stakeholders are
ultimately concerned about. This study drew from this gap and
documented a stakeholder-driven model inter-comparison exer-
cise, both the scenario logic behind and the research questions of
which were informed by stakeholders' concerns. The resulting
framework indicated another knowledge gap: most multi-model
studies tend to explore ‘backcasting’ mitigation pathways and to
assess them against under-elaborated or unrealistic no-policy or
business-as-usual baselines. Our exercise, therefore, sought to
bridge this gap by outputting a realistic reference of where the EU
is headed, assuming policy ambition stagnation by extrapolating
its current efforts into the long term. Where relevant, we tried to
compare our results with findings in the literature. To the extent12possible, we explained the ranges of results tracing them back to
specific model characteristics/levels of detail.
Among key findings in response to stakeholders' questions, we
found that the EU is currently on track to overperforming its previous
target of 40% emissions cuts, although clearly requires further efforts
for its 2030 energy efficiency target, and is still far from its newest am-
bition of 55% emissions cuts by 2030. It is also looking at a 1.0–2.35
GtCO2 emissions range in 2050, which can be broken down to
2.1–2.35 GtCO2 produced by EU-regional and global macroeconomic
models, and 1.0–1.65 GtCO2 coming from global bottom-up models,
mainly tracing back tomodelling theories, detail of representation of re-
gional potentials, and confidence in key technologies. For example, we
consistently found that the level of CCS deployment appears
intertwined with deeper emissions cuts, in the current policy context;
within individual models, the same can be said about transport electri-
fication, which seems important formaximising emissions reduction by
2050. CCS also seems to play a pivotal role in hydrogen diffusion (with
most hydrogen produced post-2040 being blue, coming from CCS-
integrated sources), which is nonetheless significantly outperformed
by electrification.
The novelty of the employed approach, in which stakeholders'
concerns and questions informed the scenario framework and
scope of the exercise, is reflected in that it allowed numerous
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bles decision makers and other climate stakeholders and that is not
typically highlighted in scientific articles aimed at supporting or un-
derpinning energy and climate policy. It therefore helped assess and
better understand topics that are of concern to the engaged stake-
holders, such as the role of key technologies, economic growth, em-
ployment, etc., instead of anchoring to details of emissions and
energy mixes that are typically highlighted in traditional modelling
exercises. Even in terms of questions that have been explored in re-
cent literature, our stakeholder-driven setting allowed us to make
progress towards openness of and inclusiveness in the scientific pro-
cess. It is broadly acknowledged that further work is needed in the
climate-economy modelling literature to emphasise principles of
open (Pfenninger et al., 2018; Morrison, 2018) as well as compre-
hensive and comprehensible science (Nikas et al., 2021), towards
legitimising and building trust in the modelling tools and their re-
sults. At the same time, the employed approach also allowed to de-
fine and adopt a scenario logic that is heavily underrepresented in
the literature: while studies exploring ambition and mitigation ef-
forts in backcasting settings tend to focus more on the resulting mit-
igation trajectories than on their ‘reference’ scenarios against which
these are assessed, this research instead delved into and analysed in
more detail such a reference baseline per se. In essence, the
employed scenario logic attempted to serve the stakeholders' need
for more realistic reference scenarios describing the current situa-
tion, which will allow to better appreciate what must be done.
And this scenario logic would not have been designed without
stakeholders expressing their limited understanding of what ‘we
are currently looking at’ before grasping ‘what we need to do’ against
that.
There are, however, important caveats concerning this research. It
must be stressed that the resulting ‘representative baseline’ scenario
produced in this study only reflects the currently implemented policies.
For the EU regionalmodels aswell as the EU region in the globalmodels,
this encompasses an up-to-date representation of the policies compris-
ing the “2030 climate and energy framework”, including sector-specific
policies. As reflected in the Supplementary Material, this includes the
ETS, the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), the Road Vehicle Emission Per-
formance Standards for Cars and Vans, the LULUCF Regulation, the En-
ergy Efficiency Directive (EED) and the Renewable Energy Directive
(RED II). But it does not orient on its previous (−40%) or new (−55%)
2030 pledges. In other words, the motivation driving this research has
been to capture where the EU is headed given its overall policies cur-
rently in place, not what its current ambition is (as reflected in its
NDC) nor where it wants to eventually go (i.e., a 1.5 °C-compliant path-
way), and this is how our results should be interpreted. This alsomeans
that, although this is not a backcasting exercise, it comes as little
surprise that our model inter-comparison confirms that a continuation
of currently implemented policies to 2030 is found tomeet the previous
pledge of−40% emissions cuts by the end of the decade. Nevertheless,
it also showcases that, aside from overperforming this target, meet-
ing the newly agreed, more ambitious target of −55% emissions
cuts by 2030 will require a drastic upgrade of the measures, in
which this overarching goal must be broken down; it also makes a
comprehensive effort to define the emissions gap that must be
bridged.
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, the study seeks to
establish a novel multi-model analysis framework, in which research
has been designed with, rather than carried out for, stakeholders. Al-
though our research process has included thorough and meaningful in-
formation of, consultation with, and engagement of stakeholders, there
are more challenging steps to claiming a shift from participation to co-
production of knowledge and policy (Galende-Sánchez and Sorman,
2021). For example, this entails standardising a co-creative scenario
process, in which the scenario framework can be directly co-produced
with stakeholders rather than developed based on a posteriori13interpretation of their concerns in a closed scientific process, as well
as looping results back to the individuals engaged to assess the extent,
to which the protocol and results provided are novel, useful, aligned
with their expectations, and practical in terms of transforming into ac-
tion. This represents a call for research efforts towards a truly co-
creative scientific process, one that engageswith stakeholders in the be-
ginning of the research design but interacts with different bodies of
knowledge and non-scientific actors throughout, towards achieving
transdisciplinarity (Nikas et al., 2020a).
Then, from an empirical point of view, there is always room to im-
prove efforts for harmonising inputs and reducing model response
heterogeneity that traces back to input variance. More importantly,
our novel framework did not manage to explore all prioritised topics
and to address all communicated concerns. For example, although
there have been research perspectives of incorporating hard-to-
model questions on behavioural and lifestyle change (Trutnevyte
et al., 2019), in line with a stakeholder-driven and inclusive ap-
proach (Nikas et al., 2020a), these were clearly not addressed in
the proposed modelling framework. Furthermore, some aspects
like extreme decarbonisation and increased ambition did not fit
into a scenario exploring where we are headed given current policy
efforts projected into the future and aiming to design a realistic ref-
erence scenario for future studies. Other topics, like possible failure
of CCS, could only partially be addressed in this scenario: although
our study showed that failure of key technologies could bring us to
a more static representation of the energy-economy system, as de-
scribed bymacroeconomic models, running themodels with techno-
logical constraints to sufficiently and explicitly respond to this
question remained outside the main scope of assessing implications
of current policy projection. Similar limitations concern stake-
holders' questions on the decline of carbon-intensive sectors or the
need for a comprehensive assessment of distributional and employ-
ment impacts. These limitations act as an urgent call for research
based on better suited toolsets and frameworks, as well as other
modes of engagement with non-scientific actors.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
A.N. and H.D. coordinated the stakeholder-inclusive protocol, with
contributions from all authors; B.M., A.N., and G.Z. coordinated the
organization of the workshop. B.B., G.C., A.C., A.E., K.K., and A.N.
conceptualised the research. B.B., I.S., and G.P.P. coordinated the protocol
for scenarios, which were designed by all authors, with notable contribu-
tions from L.C., H.D., A.E., A.G., S.G., A.Kob., S.M., A.N., S.P., D.-J.v.d.V., J.R.,
and M.V.; B.B., A.G., S.G., S.M., A.N., and D.-J.v.d.V. coordinated the
harmonisation protocol; all authors were involved in the model analysis,
with notable contributions from D.-J.v.d.V., J.M. (GCAM), A.G., A.Kob.,
N.G., S.M. (TIAM), S.G., A.Hawk. (MUSE), A.Kol. (42), S.P., M.V. (GEMINI-
E3), L.C., E.D. (ICES), A.A.-K., H.B. (E3ME), B.B., A.F., P. LeM., P.Z. (NEMESIS),
G.C., A.C., R.D.M., A.E., M.G. (EU-TIMES), A.Her. (FORECAST), F.N., and P.P.
(ALADIN). B.B. and A.E. compiled the results. B.B., A.C., A.E., K.K., and A.N.
discussed the results as well as created the figures, with feedback from
all other authors. A.N. coordinated the writing of the paper; all authors
provided feedback and contributed to writing the paper, with notable
contributions from B.B., A.C., A.E., and K.K.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influ-
ence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the H2020 European Commission (EC)
Project “PARIS REINFORCE” under Grant Agreement No. 820846. N.G.
A. Nikas, A. Elia, B. Boitier et al. Science of the Total Environment 793 (2021) 148549was supported by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC)
(grant no. NE/L002515/1) and the Department for Business, Energy
and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). The sole responsibility for the paper con-
tent lies with the authors; the paper does not necessarily reflect the
opinions of the EC or BEIS.
Appendix A. Scenario protocol
The scenario used in this study is designed to reflect current levels of
mitigation efforts in the EU, referred to as current policies. To extend
the mitigation efforts implied by current policies to 2030 (the period
for which current policies' impact can reasonably be projected)
beyond 2030, we use the carbon prices that, on their own (absent
other current policies), achieve the same levels of emissions as current
policies in 2030. We call these carbon prices “equivalent carbon prices”
(ECPs).
We extend the ECPs in the EU, growing at the rate of GDP per
capita from 2030 onwards, to represent a “constant” economic bur-
den from carbon pricing, as proxied by the ratio of carbon price to
per capita income over time. After 2030, current policies are as-
sumed to remain in place as “constant” or “minimum” bounds on
effort.
The implementation of current policies after 2030 as “constant” or
“minimum” levels depends on the model:
- For models that have detailed representations of energy systems
(bottom-up), current policies are simulated as constraints. For
example, where current policies represent the achievement of a
minimum share of renewables in power generation, or minimum
vehicle efficiency standards, then these policies are kept constant
(i.e., a constant minimum share of renewables, or constant mini-
mum vehicle efficiency) beyond 2030. Note that the renewables
shares, or vehicle efficiency levels, are not kept constant, but rather
at a constant minimum bound—this allows the models to simulate
over-achievement against these policy targets, if e.g. the cost-
competitiveness of renewables or more efficient vehicles drives
them to do so.
- For macroeconomic models (top-down), policies are more
commonly applied as minimum subsidy levels to specific low-
carbon technologies, to encourage their take-up. In such
cases, these subsidies are held constant in the period beyond
2030, to simulate a continuation of policy support for these
technologies.
In particular, for all models (except for 42, see below) we carry out
the following steps:
1) We implement current EU policies to 2030, and record emissions in
2030.
2) We re-run the models without current policies, using EU
economy-wide carbon prices to reach the levels of emissions in
2030 recorded in Step (1). Depending on the model, the emis-
sions in 2030 can be implemented as caps, allowing the model
to find the corresponding carbon prices endogenously. The ECPs
in 2030 are the carbon prices that reproduce the emissions
caused by current policies to 2030 in the EU—i.e., the emissions
recorded in the Step (1).
3) We run themodel from2030until 2050,with the ECPs growingwith
GDP per capita in the EU. The starting point should be the end point
of the scenario run in Step (2).We then record emissions trajectories
to 2050.
4) We re-run the model from the beginning, with
a. Current policies to 2030, kept as constant or minimum levels after
2030.
b. The emissions trajectories in Step (3), as emissions caps. Depend-
ing on the model, the carbon prices needed above current policies14to achieve the required emissions reductions may be computed
endogenously by the model.
The 42 model does not calculate carbon prices. In this respect, only
for this model:
1) We keep the rate of change in emissions intensity of GDP constant
after 2030.
2) We implement current policies to 2030, record the resulting
emissions in the EU in the modelled period, and compute the
annualised rate of change of emissions intensity (emissions per
GDP) to 2030.
3) Starting with emissions in 2030 recorded in Step (1), we compute
emissions pathways to 2050 by applying the annualised rate
of change of emissions intensity computed in Step (1) beyond
2030. This step does not involve running the model.
4) We re-run the model from the beginning, with
a. Current policies to 2030, kept as constant or minimum levels after
2030.
b. The emissions trajectories in Step (2), as caps.
The evolution of carbon prices across models—except for the two
sectoral models, FORECAST and ALADIN; and 42, which does not sup-
port a carbon price—is presented in Fig. A1.
Fig. A1. Carbon price trajectories across models.
It should be noted that, while the carbon price is “model-specific” in
the sense that it varies significantly bymodel (somemodels requiring a
much higher carbon price than others to reach the same target, as also
evident in Fig. A1), it has a consistent definition and interpretation
across models. A different approach, such as equalising the economic
burden instead of the carbon price, on the other hand, would be defined
in much more heterogeneous ways across our models, depending on
the model type. While this does not make it impossible in principle to
use, e.g., a “constant economic burden” approach, the use of different
measures of economic burden in each model would render this a
much more complicated and hence difficult-to-interpret approach.
Such an approach would not reflect consistency across models, if the
measures of economic burden vary too much. The starting point of our
projecting approach is consistent (across models) measures of “effort”
caused by current policies, which are then projected forward. This is
also the main reason behind carbon price (and emissions intensity)
being a widely used and well understood variable in integrated
assessment modelling research.
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(version)
Coverage Description and EU disaggregation
General equilibrium GEMINI-E3 World GEMINI-E3 (Bernard and Vielle, 2008) is a multi-country, multi-sector, recursive computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
simulating all relevant domestic and international markets, which are assumed to be perfectly competitive—except for foreign
trade, in which goods of the same sector produced by different countries are considered economically different and not




World ICES is a recursive-dynamic multi-regional CGE model developed to assess economy-wide impacts of climate change policies
(Eboli et al., 2010); for the purposes of this study, the XPS version is used (Parrado et al., 2020) with a more detailed
representation of government behaviour and private households. Like GEMINI-E3, it assumes market equilibrium simulta-
neously in each market or region and requires calibration to data on national and international socio-accounting information
as well as a series of elasticities of substitution. The ICES model covers Europe combining detailed representation of specific
Member States (Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, etc.) and aggregate regions (RoEU).
Partial equilibrium GCAM
(v5.3)
World GCAM is a global IAM representing human and Earth system dynamics (Edmonds et al., 1994), exploring the interactions
between energy, agriculture and land use, economy and climate (Calvin et al., 2019); it operates on a “recursive dynamic”
cost-optimisation basis, solving for the least-cost energy system in a given period, before moving to the next time period and
performing the same exercise. We use GCAM v5.3 in this analysis (Kyle et al., 2021). GCAM portrays Europe combining two
main region aggregates: EU-15 and EU-12.
TIAM
(Grantham)
World TIAM is a multi-region, global version of TIMES that combines an energy system representation of fifteen regions, among which
Europe is portrayed as a single aggregated region, with options to mitigate non-CO2 greenhouse gases as well as non-energy
CO2 mitigation options, such as afforestation, in each of these regions. As such, it can be used to explore a variety of questions
on how to mitigate climate change through energy system transformations, as well as reductions in non-energy CO2 emissions
and non-CO2 emissions. The model operates on a “perfect foresight” welfare cost-optimisation basis: all consequences of
technology deployments, fuel extraction and energy price changes over the entire time horizon are considered when
minimising the cost of the energy system. The TIAM-Grantham version is used (Napp et al., 2017).
Energy system EU-TIMES Europe EU-TIMES is an enhanced version of the open source JRC-EU-TIMES model (Simoes et al., 2013), a European version of TIMES,
designed for analysing the role of energy technologies and innovation needs for meeting European energy and climate policy
targets, representing EU Member States and neighboring countries, where each country is modelled as one region. It can
consider policies affecting the entire energy system, sectors, group of or individual technologies/commodities (Sgobbi et al.,
2016; Blanco et al., 2018).
MUSE World MUSE is an agent-based, partial equilibrium modelling environment for the assessment of how national or multi-regional
energy systems may change over time (Giarola et al., 2021b; Kerdan et al., 2019), from production of primary resources,
through conversion, and finally end-use consumption to meet economy-wide service demands, explicitly characterising the
decision-making process of firms and consumers in the energy system and capturing various features of market imperfection.
The MUSE model covers Europe combining detailed representation of specific Member States (Denmark, Finland) and aggre-
gate regions (EU7, EU18).
42 World 42 is a simulation model providing the detailed energy balances for 50 countries and regions, whereby energy consumption is
modelled as a combination of gross, structural, and technological factors, considering the energy intensities trajectories of
various sectors and using their historical trends to estimate realistic transition pathways (Shirov et al., 2016). 42 does not
support a carbon price; instead, it used the rate of change in emissions intensity of GDP up to 2030, then kept it constant
post-2030, as in Fawcett et al. (2015) and Vandyck et al. (2016).
Macroeconometric NEMESIS Europe The NEMESIS model (Brécard et al., 2006; Capros et al., 2014a) is a sectoral, detailed macroeconometric system of models for
every European country, for studying issues linking economic development, competitiveness, employment, and public
accounts to economic and structural policies involving long-term effects (Capros et al., 2014b; Ravet et al., 2019).
E3ME (v6.1) World E3ME is a highly disaggregated macroeconometric model that is detailed in energy technologies like CGE models but does not
assume optimal agent behaviour nor market clearance to reach short-term equilibrium (Barker, 1998); it uses historical data
and econometrically estimated parameters relations to dynamically simulate the behaviour of the economy. In this study, we
use E3ME v6.1 (Hafner et al., 2020; Bachner et al., 2020). The E3ME model covers Europe at the regional level as well as at the
national level (Member States plus candidate countries).
Sectoral ALADIN Europe ALADIN (Plötz et al., 2014) is an agent-based simulation model for assessing market diffusion of alternative fuel (passenger and
heavy-duty) vehicles in Germany and Europe until 2050, based on driving data of thousands of individual vehicles treated as
agents, with changes in prices, user preferences, and model availability leading to road transport market evolution (Plötz et al.,
2019).
FORECAST Europe FORECAST is a bottom-up simulation model for analysing the long-term development of energy demand and emissions for the
industry, residential and tertiary sectors at national level, considering a broad range of mitigation options to reduce CO2
emissions, combined with a high level of technological detail (Fleiter et al., 2018).Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.148549.
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